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C0!-!(76)  28  final A  EUROPEAN  EXPORT  BANK  - THE  NEXT  STEP 
1.  In July last year,  the  Commission  sent  to  the  Council  a 
communication examining  the  opportunity of creating a  European 
Export  Bank  (EEB)  and  the objectives  and methods  which  such  a 
Bank might  adopt  (COM  (75)  500).  In doing  so,  it stated that it 
intended to consult  export credit insurers,  banking and  industrial 
circles in the  Community.  This  has  now  been done.  In the light 
of these consultations,  the  Commission  now  sends  to the  Council  a 
proposal  for the creation of an  EEB. 
The  general  analysis 
2.  In its communication last July,  the  Commission drew attention 
to  the  probable increase in the  volume  and  number of large 
multinational projects,  and  to the increasing competition there 
would  be  for  such projects.  It pointed to  the wide  divergences 
between the practices of the national  export credit organizations 
of the Member  States,  and  thus  to the desirability - without 
adding in any  way  to international competition on the  terms  of 
export credits - to  improve  the  coherence of  the  export credit 
facilities available to  Community  exporters in this field of 
multinational projects.  It pointed to  the limitations inherent 
in any  effort at present  to find  a  solution by  recourse  to existing 
national  systems,  and  therefore  concluded that it seemed desirable 
to create an  EEB  which,  as its main task,  would  be  able to offer 
both to the  Community  exporters  and  to foreign  buyers  of capital 
goods  and  services  produced within the  Community,  credit and 
insurance  on terms  comparable  to those available to  the exporters 
of other major trading countries. 
The  consultations 
3.  During  the  second half of  1975,  the  Commission took  steps 
to consult  export credit insurers  and industrial and  banking 
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circles in the  Community.  This  was  done  both directly,  in a  series 
of  ad  hoc meetings,  and  through  the  appropriate  representative bodies  -
the  Banking  Federation,  the  Permanent  Conference  of  Chambers  of 
Commerce  and  Industry and  UNICE  - from  whom  written opinions  were 
received  (copies  attached).  The  Commission also  received a  pre-
liminary  comment  from  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB).  The 
Commission is very grateful to  the organizations  and  individuals 
consulted for  the helpful  advice  they gave. 
4.  The  consultations  of industrial and  banking circles unanimously 
confirmed that the existing difference of national  practice already 
pose  real  problems  to  Community  exporters  and  those  concerned with the 
financing of  exports.  The  consultations also confirmed the prospect 
of growth in the  number  and  volume  of multinational  contracts in the 
future,  although it was  not  possible  to give  any meaningful  indication 
of  the  size of this  growth.  It was  thus  common  ground  that  the 
present  situation is an inadequate  base  for the  future  growth of 
Community  exports  of this kind. 
5.  As  to the means  of correcting this  situation,  however,  there 
was  less unanimity: 
UNICE  concludes  in favour  of  the creation of  a  European 
banking  organization with  a  broad measure  of financial 
autonomy  which  would  concentrate  on lending,  financing 
exchange  transactions  and  trade-linked investments.  As 
concerns  insurance  they would  see  the organization as 
serving initially as  a  coordinating and  liaison body  between 
the various national  insurance organizations  but  which might 
in the  longer  term take  over the  role of reinsurance  body 
for harmonized national  systems.  The  organization would 
concentrate particularly on all multinational  contracts or 
contracts  of benefit  to the  Community  involving anything in 
the  region of or exceeding one million u.a. 
The  permanent  Conference  wonders  whether national  systems 
could not  be  extended,  notes  the  problems  for an  EEB  of 
supplying  single currency financing  and  the limits on its 
action if - as it must  - it is to  leave  scope  for financing 
by  banks,  and  concludes  that,  in the absence  of  a  more  detailed 
explanation from  the  Commission,  it would  be  difficult to 
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resolve present  problems  by  way  of  an  EEB  but  rather that 
greater efforts  should  be  made  to harmonize  national 
practices. 
The  banking Federation questions  whether multicurrency 
financing is  the most  important difficulty and  stresses 
the  problems  of loss of  time  resulting from  the  need  for 
separate discussions  between each  bank  and its national 
export credit organization,  and  therefore underlines  the 
need for "closer cooperation by all the  bodies  concerned". 
It continues that,  while  some  members  feel  an  EEB  would  be 
useful  others  doubt  whether an  EEB  \vill  be  created with 
means  sufficient to  improve  on the present  situation.  It 
therefore concludes  that the first step  should  be  co-
operation,  which  could  pave  the  way  for the later creation 
of  an  EEB. 
Banking circles,  in individual  consultations,  stressed in 
addition the  need for  an  EEB  to  work  with  the  banks, 
suggested that while  the volume  of  business  which  could 
come  to the  Bank  was  extremely uncertain it could  be  large, 
and  doubted whether  single currency financing  was  very 
important. 
Industrial circles,  in individual  consultations,  were 
inclined to  seek to extend the role  of  an  EEB  (beyond 
multinational  contracts  which  were  only  a  relatively 
small  part of total exports),  or to press  for harmonisation 
as  a  more  far-reaching alternative. 
6.  In addition to  these consultations,  there has  also  been a 
preliminary discussion of  the  Commission paper in the Policy 
Coordination Group  for  Credit  Insurance,  Credit  Guarantees  and 
Financial  Credits  of the  Council.  In this discussion,  most  speakers 
felt that the  present situation was  inadequate,  of  whom  some  accepted 
that an  EEB  could  be  useful  and others  wished further  study of the 
idea.  The  others felt that the present  situation was  not  inadequate 
and  that an  EEB  would  not  be useful.  In this connection,  particular 
stress was  laid on the  consequences  of introducing specific export 
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credit terms  at  Community  level when  the.economic  conditions 
of the  Nember  States were  so  divergent,  because  this might  lead 
to the  softening of  terms  provided for exports  by  some  Nember 
States.  In addition, it would  be difficult to restrict the  new 
terms  to the limited area  envisaged for an EEB  because  pressure 
would  develop for comparable  terms  to be  granted nationally in 
other areas. 
7.  The  EIB,  in its preliminary comments,  referred to the un-
certainties as  the  size of business  which might  be undertaken by 
an  EEB  and  drew attention to  the possibility that the  EIB  itself 
might  contribute,  under Article  18(1)  of the  EIB's  Statute,  to 
financing packages  arranged  by  national credit institutions and 
banks  in the  form  of buyers'  credits,  either granted directly to 
an enterprise outside the  Community  or channelled through  a 
Community  participant. 
Consideration of  the results of these consultations 
8.  The  Commission has  given careful  thought  to  the points made 
in these consultations.  It notes  the widespread view that the 
present  situation is an inadequate  base  for the  expected future 
growth of multinational exports,  and that improvements  are essential. 
Two  forms  of  improvement  emerge  from  the consultations  - the  idea of 
an EEB,  welcomed  by  some,  and  the possibility of increased national 
cooperation based on extensive harmonisation preferred by  others at 
least as  a  starting point. 
9.  The  Commission  sympathises  with  the view that the  long term 
answer for export credits of all types  of business must  lie in the 
harmonisation of national  practices.  It has  for many  years  pursued 
this objective,  but  can only note that despite its repeated efforts, 
little progress  has  been made.  The  Commission  intends to press 
ahead with its efforts to  secure  general harmonisation.  It has 
been fortified in this approach  by  the recent Opinion of the  Court 
of Justice which  stressed the need for rigorous uniformity in 
export credit practices within the  Community  as  part of the  common 
commercial  policy.  But its experience to date,  and  the wide 
divergences  in national  practices  on many  technical points of 
importance,  enshrined in national legislation,  rules  out  any 
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early improvement  by this route.  The  Commission does  not  therefore 
wish  improvements  which  are urgently needed for multinational 
contracts to  be  dependent  on harmonisation which  can 'only  be 
achieved progressively.  It therefore considers that the  idea 
of an EEB  remains  valid. 
10.  On  more  detailed points  the  Commission accepts  the  comments 
which have  been made  that lack of single currency financing is not 
at present  a  major obstacle.  It therefore does  not  think that an 
EEB  should  be  required to provide finance  in a  single currency.  It 
notes  however that  some  consulted believe that single currency 
financing may  become  important in the  future  and  considers that an 
EEB  should  judge in the light of its own  experience ·the extent of 
this need  and·  do  its best to respond accordingly,  including recourse 
as  appropriate to the use  of the  European unit of account.  It 
also accepts,  indeed it was  its intention from  the outset,  that 
an  EEB  should work closely with banks  involved in export  finance 
who  would  continue to have  a  major role to play,  a  role which would 
reduce  the amount  of  financing that  an  EEB  would  be  called on to 
provide.  It is doubtful  about  the prospects of progress  through 
greater cooperation between existing national  bodies in view of the 
present inadequacies in this area.  It is also' doubtful  whether it 
would  be  sensible for an  EEB  to take  on a  wide  range of export 
credit  busines~ from  the outset although this would  not rule out 
the possibility of later development. 
11.  The  Commission has  given particular attention to the  problem 
of possible  softening of export credit terms  suggested as  implicit 
in the  idea of an  EEB  at the present  time.  This  objection is of 
a  very  general  character and  could  be  raised not  only to an  EEB 
but  to  any harmonisation  (as  opposed to adoption of minimum  levels) 
of export credit terms  within the  Community.  The  Commission finds 
it hard to accept  this argument  as  a  valid objection to 
harmonisation  of  Community  practice,  particularly in the light 
of the  Court  Opinion referred to above.  It must  repeat its often 
stated support  for  an end  to competition in export credit terms. 
In pursuing the  idea of an EEB,  it is concerned to  improve  the 
facilities available to exporters wherever they may  be  in the 
Community,  not  to  soften the  terms  which are given.  In the 
context of an  EEB  and more  generally, it considers that the 
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Community  should  in no  sense  be  leaders  in the  provision of  terms 
below market  rates.  It therefore  considers  that the principle 
should  be  adopted whereby  an  EEB  would  supply credit at market 
rates;  in line with universal  practice in the  export credit field, 
Community  terms  should  be  capable,  however,  of  being aligned 
downwards  (within the  limits of our international obligations) 
to match  conditions  likely to  be  granted to exporters  in third 
countries. 
12.  It should  be  recalled that  the extent  of international 
competition in the  terms  of  export credits is at the moment  the 
subject of international negotiations,  with  the  object of  reaching 
a  "Gentleman's Agreement"  which will  set minima  to  the degree of 
concessional  terms  provided  for export  credits.  If these 
negotiations  can  be  brought  to  a  successful conclusion,  as  the 
Commission very much  hopes*,  the  scope  for financing  below normal 
market  rates will be  limited,  and  so  the maximum  possible degree 
of concessional  financing will  be  known  and  restricted.  In these 
circumstances,  the  Commission considers that  the  principle referred 
to in the  previous  paragraph is an adequate  reply to the  problem of 
softening of export credit terms  as  an objection to  the idea of  an 
EEB. 
13.  The  Commission  has  also  taken careful note  of  the  possibility 
for  the  EIB  to undertake  financing  of buyer credits in certain 
circumstances.  It has  concluded  that  a  separate organization is 
nevertheless needed  to undertake  export  finance.  This is because 
this activity is of different nature  from  that of  the  EIB's  present 
tasks  and  because  the  management  of  a  Community  export credit 
system is one  of  the  means  of  the  common  commercial  policy and  must 
therefore  be  closely  linked with  Community  procedures  in this area. 
There will however  be  possibilities of cooperation between  the 
EIB  and  the  EEB  which  should  be  kept  in mind • 
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*  The  Commission has  recently  sent  to the  Council  a  recommendation 
for negotiating directives  for  these discussions. -7-
The  Commission's  proposal 
14.  In the light of  these considerations,  the  Commission  remains 
of the view that an  EEB  as  conceived in its communication of July 
1975  is the  best  way  to deal  with  a  growing  area of business  of 
particular importance  and  for which  existing national  systems  by 
common  accord  do  not  provide  adequately.  It therefore  submits  to 
the  Council  a  draft  regulation (attached)  for the establishment  of 
an EEB.  The  details of this  proposal  are  commented  on  below. 
15.  The  EEB  will  be  created by  a  Council  regulation.  It is 
envisaged that it should  be  a  new  and  separate organization,  managed 
by  a  management  committee  and  responsible  to  a  board of directors 
which would  take  decisions  on all borrowing  and  lending operations 
(within the  financial  ceiling determined for  the  EEB).  This  board 
would  be  composed  of suitably qualified people  nominated  by  the 
Member  States,  and  by  the  Commission. 
16.  Because  of the  need  to link an organization dealing with 
export credits closely to the  Community  institutions dealing with 
the  common  commercial  policy generally, it is envisaged that  the 
Commission would  be  able to issue directives  to  the  EEB  which  would 
be  binding  on it, and  which  would  reflect the  principles in the 
proposed regulation and  the considerations  based  on  the  Community's 
general  common  commercial  policy.  These directives would  be  notified 
to  the  Council  which  could annul  or amend  them  by  qualified majority. 
The  Commission would  also have  a  right  of veto in the  board of 
directors,  which  would  be  able to bring  a  matter on which there was 
dispute before the  Council;  the  Council  would  then have  to decide 
within a  short,  fixed period. 
17.  The  EEB  would  deal  both with industry and  with  banking  and 
other organizations in the export credit field;  it would  work very 
closely with the  banks  which  would  continue  to  be  responsible for at 
least a  part of the  finance  of each·project. 
18.  The  EEB  would  provide  a  full  range  of export credit 
insurance.  To  the  extent  that  the  EEB  was  in addition called 
upon to provide  finance,  it would  do  so  from  borrowed  funds. 
It would  raise its funds  on the  basis  of  a  Community  guarantee 
of its borrowings.  This  guarantee would  be  fixed  annually in 
the  Community  BUdget.  The  Community  Budget will also  be 
called upon to  provide  the initial costs  of setting up  the  EEB, 
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and  to  stand  ready  to  finance  to  the  extent necessary  any  operational 
deficit which  could arise,  this also being  the ultimate  support  for 
insttrance  provided  (though  the  EEB  would  normally  wish  to  seek  to 
reinsure  the risks it assumes).  However,  the  EEB  would 
be  endowed with  a  small capital  - of  100  MUC  - from  the  Community 
Budget.  This mixed capital  structure is designed  for maximum 
flexibility in a  situation when it is difficult to tell in advance 
the  scale of  business  to  be undertaken,  while it provides  the  same 
degree  of control  to the  Council  and  the  European Parliament  of 
the  scale of  the  EEB's  commitments.  However,  once  the  EEB  is 
established and  has  gained  experience this capital  structure 
should  be  reviewed  to  see whether  a  new capital  structure would 
be  a  better base  for its future activity. 
19.  As  to  terms  of  finance,  this  would  be  governed  by  the 
principle already mentioned  (para  11).  The  normal  securities 
would  be  required as  protection for  finance  provided. 
How  the  EEB  might  work 
20.  The  details  above  describe  the  essential  elements  to  be 
incorporated in the  Council  regulation.  The  specific  way  in which 
the  EEB  would  carry out its functions,  within the  framework  of  the 
principles  and  institutional  structure laid down,  would  be  a  matter 
for later decision,  in which  the management  committee  and  the  board 
of directors of  the  EEB  would  play  a  part.  The  following  paragraphs 
however  are  intended to  show  how  the  EEB  might  operate  on the 
basis  of the attached draft regulation. 
21.  The  EEB  should establish an  independent  operational  standing, 
and  be  open to approach  both  by  firms  engaged in multinational 
projects  of  Community  interest and  by  the  commercial  bankers  who 
are acting for  such firms.  In each case,  the  EEB  will wish  to 
appraise the  project in conjunction with  the  banks  involved,  who 
will  be  required to  find  a  part of  the  financing in each case.  The 
EEB  will also wish  to take  account  of  the  normal  considerations of 
risk and  exposure  in its own operations. 
22.  The  EEB's  assistance,  in the light of this appraisal of 
the project,  may  on  one  hand  take  the  form  of credit insurance 
within certain limits laid down in a  directive  from  the  Commission. 
This  would  be  in the  form  of  a  direct  insurance of  payment  given 
to  the  banks  which are  advancing  finance.  The  insurance  could 
cover the  commercial  and  political risks  involved,  including those 
of transfer.  To  avoid  a  situation in which  the  EEB  accummulated 
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all such risks, it would  seek to  reinsure itself in part or whole 
with public  and  private sector insurers.  A  premium  would  be  charged 
for the  EEB's  insurance,  which  would  take  account  of the actuarial 
risk. 
23.  On  the  other hand  the  EEB  may  provide  a  part of the 
export  finance up  to whatever limit may  be  adopted  by  the  council 
of administration.  This  would  be  in the  form  of either buyer or 
supplier credits.  It would  be  provided in cases  where  a 
complementary action by  the  EEB  seemed appropriate.  It would  be 
supplied on terms  in accordance with the principle proposed in 
paragraph 9,  from  funds  borrowed  by  the  EEB  on the basis  of the 
Community's  guarantee of its operations.  The  finance  supplied 
by  the  EEB  would  in principle  be  in the  currencies of its borrowings; 
but as  far as  possible  the  EEB  would  seek to arrange its borrowing 
programme  so  as  to  be  able to  supply currencies  sought.  It would 
not,  at least initially, undertake  exchange risks,  though it would 
seek to  develop practices  which  would  best meet  the  evolving problems 
found  in this area by  Community  exporters. 
24.  The  EEB  would  need  to establish close cooperation with  the 
national export credit organizations.  It would  also need  to keep 
in touch with  Community  organizations  concerned with aid expenditure, 
not  because  the  EEB  should  provide aid  funds,  but because  many 
projects requiring export credit finance  are  linked  to projects 
financed  separately  on  aid  terms. 
Conclusion 
25.  The  Commission hereby  submits  its proposal  for  an  EEB  to 
the  Council.  It does  so  with openness  of spirit to  any  constructive 
modifications which may  be  suggested which may  help to  improve 
present arrangements  to  the  benefit of  Community  exporters. PronoF:<!.l  -for  a  Counr.il  Rnm.1lation  (EEC) 
setting up  a  European Export  Bank 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMUUUITIES, 
Having regard to  the  Treaty establishing the  European  Economic  Community, 
and  in particular Articles 113 and  235  thereof; 
Having regard to  the proposal from  the  Commission; 
Having regard to the  Opinion of the  European Parliament; 
Having regard to  the  Opinion of the  Economic  and  Social  Committee; 
Whereas  the  common  commercial policy entails  Community  action in respect  of 
export credit, 
Whereas  the  export policy intruments available in the Member  States do  not 
always enable multinational export  contracts to be  financed  and  insured on 
the best terms; 
Whereas  a  Community  instrument  should therefore be  created to facilitate, 
through financing and  credit insurance,  exports of capital goods  and  of 
services to third countries-where  such  exports  involve  two  or more  under-
takings located in different Member  States; 
lfuereas  the most  appropriate instrument for this purpose is a  European  Export 
Bank  with legal personality set up within the framework  of the European 
Communities,  and  whereas  the necessary provision must  be made  for that Bank 
to act in accordance with the guidelines given it by the  Institutions in 
the field of the  common  commercial  policy; 
Whereas  the  Treaty does  not provide  the requisite powers  therefore; 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  REGULATION: -2-
Article 1 
A European  Export  Ba:rJ<:,  hereinafter called "the Bank",  is hereb;y 
set up. 
'l'he  Banl::  shall have  legal personality. It shall  enjoy in  each  of 
the  Member  Statec  the most  extensive legal  capacity accorded to  legal 
persona. 
The  Bank  shall  operate  solely in the  gcn~ral interest of the 
Community.  It shall be  non-profit-making.  It shall operate  in accordance 
with principles of  sound  bucincss management. 
Article  2 
The  purpose  of the  Bank  shall be  to facilitate  the  export  of 
goods  and  cervices by undertakings  located  in two  or more  Member  States 
to  third countries,  where  such  exports constitute  operations of  common 
European interest. 
The  Bank  may  give  its asci  stance by  t·mY  of finance  or  b2>'·  t-m,y  of 
credit  insurance,  Hhere  appropriate  in cooperation vdth  credit  incurance 
institutions in the Kember  States. 
The  provision of finance  by the  Ban.'!(  shall be  conditional  on  the 
availabili  t;r of other financinG facilities. 
The  Balli<:  shall  operate within the  frnmet·rork  of the  general 
guidelinec of the  commercial  policy and  the  economic  and financial policy 
adopted under  the  Treat;,r by  the  Council,  and  in acccrda:r.ce  with  cuch 
directives aG  the  Commission  may  give it. 
Hhen  t~e  Commission  adopts  such directives,  it shall forthwith 
inform  the  Council,  which may,  b;y  a  qualified rna jeri  ty,  amend  or rescind 
them  within  tv1o  months. - :l-
For  the  purpocc  of its operations  the  Bank  shall have  authority 
inter ~: 
(i)  to  conduct  or take part in negotiations  on  behalf or in tho  interest  of 
undertakings in connection · :i  th the  export  of capital  goods  and related 
services for multinational projects; 
(ii) to provide  supplier and  buyer credit; 
(iii) to  conclude  contracts in any  negotiable  currency or in units of account; 
(iv)  to  issue  guarantees  and  enenge  in insurance,  reinsurance and  coinsurance 
transactions in respect  of political,  commercial  and transfer risks; 
(v)  to provide  credit  on  the  terms  of the market  or, Hithin tho  limits set 
by international agreements  and  arrangements binding upon  the  Community, 
on  tho  terms  comparable Hith  such  terms as nay be  granted to exporters 
established in third countries; 
(vi)  to grant loans and  refinancing facilities to banks  or other financial 
institutions in connection with multinational export  contracts to be 
financed by them. 
Article 4 
Tho  initial capital of tho Bank  shall be  one  hundred million units 
of account,  placed at its uisposal by  the  Community  and  entered in the 
Community  budget. 
Article 5 
Tho  Bank may  borroH  on  international financial markets  tho  funds 
needed  to discharge its duties. 
'rho  Bank  may  borroH  on  tho financial markets  of a  Member  State in 
accordance with the legal provisions applying to domestic  issues,  or,  should 
there be  no  such provisions in a  Member  State,  when  that State and  the Bank 
have  reached agreement  on  tho  loan to be  raised by the Bank. 
~~e competent authorities in the Member  State may  refuse their assent 
only if serious disruption of the financial markets  of that State is to be 
feard. -4-
Article G 
The  Bank's borroHings  chall  be  guaranteed by the  Community  up  to 
a  maximum  amount  fixed annually by  the Budeet in a  special  subdivision. 
Article 7 
The  Bank  ::;hall  be able  to dispose  of the proceeds  of premiums, 
interect  pa~mcnts and  administrative  charges received,  of sums  recovered 
by it, of the proceeds  of  the  placing of any available  funds not  immediately 
required to meet  its obligations and  of all other funds  and  revenues received 
in connection with its operations. 
Article 8 
The  Bank  shall be directed by a  board  of directors and  managed  by 
a  management  committee. 
Article 9 
The  board of directors shall  consist of ten  re~tlar members  and 
ten al  tcrnates,  vrho  shall be  persons  \'Those  competence  in the field  of the 
Bank's vrorl::  is beyond  doubt. 
Each  r.Tembcr  State and  the  Commission  shall appoint  one  regular 
member  and  one  alternate. 
The  term  of the members  of the board of directors shall be five 
years,  rcnevrable.  At  the  expiry of their term  or in the  event  of their 
resignation,  members  shall remain in office until reappointed or replaced. 
The  board of directors shall appoint  one  of its m€·mber:::  to be 
chairman and  tHo  to be  vice-chairmen for  a  term  of  one  year. 
TI1e  decisions of the  board  of directors shall be  by absolute 
majority of its members. -5-
The  Commission  representative may  veto decisions in the  interest 
of  the  Community.  In  such  cases the board of directors may  by an absolute 
majority of its members  refer the  issue  to  the  Council,  vlhich  nhall  decide 
by qualified majority.  If the  Council has not acted \'li thin a  fortnit;ht, 
the veto  cha.ll  stand. 
Article 10 
'rhe  board of directors,cnsuring that the  Co:nmission's directives 
are  complied with: 
shall,  on  proposals from  the management  committee,  decide upon  the Bank's 
borrov;ings  and  finance  or credit  insurance  operation::;; 
shall adopt  the rules  of procedure  of  the Balli(; 
shall approve  the  ammal report  submitted by  the management  cornmi ttee; 
shall approve  the annual balance  sheet  and profit and  loss account. 
Article ll 
The  management  coLw1i ttec shall  com::ist  of a  chairman and  four 
other members  v1hose  independence and  competence  in beyond  doubt.  They 
shall be  appointed by the board of directors for a  term  of six years, 
renewable.  Their appointment  ma;y  be  terminated.  The  management  comrni ttee 
shall prepare  the decisions to be  taken by  the board of directors and  shall 
ensure their proper execution. 
Article 12 
The  staff of the Baruc  shall be responsible to the  chairman of the 
management  co~~ittee for the  proper performance  of their duties. 
The  Bank's staff regulations shall be  adopted by  the  Council,  by 
a  qualified majority,  upon a  proposal  from  the  Commission. -6-
Article 13 
B;y  31  March  at the latest the board  of directors shall adopt, 
on  the basis of a  draft prepared by the  management  committee,  the  annual 
general report  on  the activities and  financial  situation of the Bank,  and 
shall fonmrd it to  the  Commission. 
Article 14 
1.  The  Bank's financial  year shall  commence  on  1  January and  end  on 
31  December. 
2.  The  board of directors shall draw up  estimates of the Bank's 
administrative  expenditure which  shall be  submitted to the 
Commission  by  31  r.Ia.rch  at  the latest.  W1ere  necessary,  ouch 
expenditure  shall be met  from  the  B~dget of the  Communities. 
3.  The  Bank  shall each year draw  up  a  balance  sheet  for  the past 
financial year,  to v1hich  shall be  annexed an operating account. 
These  documents,  certified by an approved auditor,  shall be 
submitted by  1  March  at the  latest to  the  audit board referred 
to  in the first paragraph of Article  206  of the  Treaty.  The  audit 
board shall draw up a  report  on  the Bank's accounts as provided 
in the  second  paragraph of Article  206  of the  Traty. 
The  balance  sheet  and  the audit board's report,  together with the 
Commission's  comments,  shall be  submitted by the  Commission  to the 
Council  and  the  European  Parliament  by  31  October at  the latest. 
The  Council  and  the  European Parliament shall  give a  discharge  to 
the board  of directors of the Bank  as provided in the  fourth 
paragraph of Article  206  of the Treaty. 
4.  &~debit balance  on  the Bank's operating account  shall be met 
from  the Budget  of the  Communities. -7-
Article 15 
The  members  of the board  of directors and  the management  committee, 
the staff and all persons  taking part in the  operations  of the Bank  shall 
retrain,  even after relinquishing their duties,  from  disclosing information 
of the kind  covered by  tlB obligation of profes:Jional  secrecy. 
Article 16 
The  language  arrangements  of the  European  Communities  shall apply 
to the Bank. 
Article 17 
The  Protocol  on  the Privileges and  Immunities  of  the  European 
Communi ties shall appl;y  to the Bank,  to  the members  of its governing bodies 
and  to its staff. 
Article  18 
The  contractual liability of the Bank  shall be  governed  by  the 
law applicable  to the contract in question. 
The  Court  of Justice  of the  European  Communities  shall have 
jurisdiction to give  judgment  1:y  virtue of  an:,•  arbitration claune  contained 
in a  contract  concluded by the Bank. 
In the  case  of non-contractual liability,  the Bank  ::;hall,  in 
accordance vii th the  general  principle::;  common  to  the  lmvs  of the !.!ember 
States,  make  good  any damage  caused by it or by ito servants in the performance 
of their duties. 
The  Court  of Justice  shall have  jurisdiction in disputes relating 
to  compensation for any  such  damage. 
The  personal liability of the Banl-::' s  servants to the Bank  shall be 
provided for  in the  E~~'s staff rebulations. -8-
Article 19 
I.lembcr  States,  members  of the board of directors and  third 
parties directly and  per:::;onally  involved may  refer to  the  Commi:::;sion 
any act  of the  Ban.l.c  whether  c::prcss  or  impliecl,  for  the  Cormninsion  to 
examine  the lcgali  t;y  of that  c.ct. 
Referral  shall be made  to  the  Comrr.isnion  ;;ithin a  fortnight  of 
the day  on  'llhich  the  party concerned first bccn.1nc  a1,:arc  of the act in 
question. 
Tne  Cor:Jmission  chn.ll  tn.J.::c  n.  dccinion '\ii thin one  month.  If no 
dcciGion  hew  been  taken ui  thin this period the  case  shall be  deemed  to 
have  been dismis;.;ed. 
Article  20 
Tho  Cormnission  shall have  authority to  take all necessn.ry  steps 
to  ensure  the establishment  and  proper viOrkinc of the Bank  and its 
coverning bodies. 
The  Bank's startinc-up expenses  shall be met  from  the budget  of 
the  Communi tics. 
Article  21 
This Regulation shall enter into force  on  the  third day following 
its publication in  the Official Journal  of the  European  Communities. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and  directly 
applicable in all Nember  States. 
Done  at Brussels, 
For  the  Council 
The  President STMIDDIG  CON"FERErfCE  OF  CI-w:wrns  OF  CQi.rr.lERCE  ;\!JD  INDUSTRY 
OF  THE  EUROPEAN  ECOHOi.IIC  Cor.rr.nniTTY 
Secretariat 
Sir, 
36  avenue  de  Tervueren 
1040  Brussels 
19  December  1975 
Annex  I 
I  refer to your letter of 29  July  1975  to Sir Robin  Brook, 
President  of the  Standing Conference of ChaDbers  of Commerce  and  Industr,y 
of the  European  Economic  Community,  requesting the Standine Conference's 
opinion on  the  Commission  comrr.unication  to  the Council  on  the  establishment 
of a  European Export  Bank. 
The  Standing Conference's opinion is duly  enclosed. 
I  tmuld  add that,  noth\·ri thstandin6 the  reservation::;  expressed 
in it,  the opinion  should be  reGarded  as a  constructive contribution to 
the  scheme  for a  European Export  Dank,  not  an  adverse verdict. 
Pray accept,  Sir,  the  expression of ~  high consideration. 
Encl  1 
Sir Christopher Soarnes 
Vice-President of the Commisdon 
of the  European Communities 
200  rue  de  la L~t 
1040  Brusselc 
(Signed)  Buchholz 
Secretar,y-General STANDING  C01JFEREiJCE  OF  CHAKDERS  OF  C01.:11ERCE  ANTI  INDUSTRY 
OF  Till  EUROPEAN  ECONONIC  COll:illiTTY 
Brussels,  15  December  1975 
OPTIJION 
on 
CO!v!l<IISSIO~J  CQI.IKU!HCA.TIOU  TO  COUN"CIL  ON 
ESTABLISm::stTT  OF  A  EUROPEAU  EY..FORT  BAHK 
1.  In the future  the  economically  advanced  industrialized countries 
v1ill  be  oblieed to concentrate their exports more  than in the past  on 
high-technology  products,  which Hill necessitate increasingly  complex 
opera  tiona.  For this rea:::;on,  and also to control the trend toHards  new 
high-technology  operations,  international  cooperation in the  export  field 
is essential.  Such  cooperation is also a  component  in European  economic 
integration. 
2.  Long-term  export  financin.r; hac  ahvays been troublecome.  Also, 
the differences in export  financing and  export  credit  incurance arrange-
ment s  between the  European Community  countries and  betv1een  them  and 
non-Cor:ununity  countriec have  a  creat deal to do  v!ith the differences in 
international competitive capacity beh;een  entcrprir;es.  So  far all 
effortc at  harmonization in this connection have  proved abortive. -2-
3.  It muot  be  acknowledged  in principle to be  praioet-.rorthy  to wioh 
to make  improvemcnto  in export  fi~nncing and  export  credit  inourance 
(notably be  enabling contracts covering  exchange  riskn to be made  out  in 
a  single currency)  in reopect  of a  major  sector of Community  exports. 
But it doeo  seem  open  to  question whether a  European Export  Bank  needs to 
be set up  in order to  do  so,  and whether it is feasible to  follow this 
course  on  the lines indicated by  the  Commission. 
(a)  The  communication to the Council  on  the  establishment of a 
Europenn  Export  Bnnk  touchen only here  and  there on  the question 
of broadening national rules on  joint  financing and  co-insurance 
of subcontracting operations or partial deliveries  from  other 
EEC  countrien.  NoH  thin is something that needs  to be  fully 
clarified right  aHay  before  setting out  to establish a  ncH 
institution.  So  too  does the queGtion Hhether the European 
Inventment  Bank  could not  do  the work  of the projected European 
Export  Bank,  if it Has  found absolutely necessary to have  an 
inntitution for the purpose.  The  problem of mobilizing 
substantial capital would not  in itnelf warrant the  establishment 
of a  special institution:  the  financing arsenal  proposed for the 
European Export  Bank  is already available to all the agencies, 
private and othervrine,  hitherto dealing Hith export  finance.  To 
tackle difficulties in connection with the use of this arsenal, 
the first thing to do  would  be to alter the rules in force.  (This 
applies principally to  financing via the international capital 
market.)  In addition,  the  Commiosion  does really tnke  a  rather 
unduly  gloomy  vieH of the Euro-currency market. -3-
(b)  Our  information to date indicates that the instances referred to 
in the communication of business having been lost to the  Communi t;y 
owing  to  export  financing difficulties are the exception.  In 
export  operations by  consortia it is ver,y  seldom  that  financing 
difficulties are  so  serious as to  cause  the whole  transaction to 
come  to grief.  At  the present  time large-scale projects are 
usually divided into tranchcs which arc  financed  and  insured 
separately. 
(c)  Besides long-term financing,  a  crucial point  in the Commission's 
proposal  for a  European Export  Bank  is conclusion of transactions 
by  consortia in a  single currency.  Novr  for it to be  possible 
to conclude the transaction in one  currency  and  for the  exchange 
risks involved in  such  an  uperation to be  el~minated as far as 
possible,  the  currency  selected for the  operation must  tally Hith 
that  employed  for the  financing of the European Export  Bank.  And 
this would  in fact  not  really be  feasible  in practice,  since 
financing by  borrowings needs to be  planned on  a  long-tern basis 
and  effected at a  time  Hhen  it is not yet  Jr...nown  in uhat  currencies 
the transactions will  be  concluded.  Actually,  the  currencies  can 
only tally if the  financing is built up  in parallel  vri th the 
different operationo  concluded,  Hhich vwuld  be  imposGible if the 
European Export  Bank  is financed  on  a  long-term baGis.  The 
present  safeguards in respect  of exchange risk are stated to be 
"not  ::mfficient  ly  effect  i vc",  but  it if::  not  ::;aid  HbJ·,  and  no 
attention if::  devoted,  nor  even mention made,  of the  posf::ibility 
of appropriate alterations to the arrangement  for  insurance against 
exchange risk by  the State. - 4-
(d)  The  European Export  Bank's  financing policy  cannot  be viewed  in 
dissociation  from  the  short-term  economic  situation in theCornmunity. 
It could be  that the  future  ~-rill  continue to  see  Cl.ifferent  cyclical 
trends and  different  financial  and  credit  policies from  one 
Community  countF.f  to  <:mother,  at any  rate unless and until there is 
some  rdgn of movement  tovrards  economic  and monetary  union.  The 
bucinoss policy of a  European  ~<.:xpor-t  Bank  could not  iQ1orc  thece 
differences in ccononic  policies.  They  would affect the Bank's 
margin of discretion in selecting export  operations to  finance, 
and its prospects of finding the "right" currencies in the capital 
market  to  ensure talliancc.  Both its debit  and its credit 
operations t-;ould  suffer severely  from  marked differences in interest 
rates and  from  controls on capital novements  Hith split  currency 
r.;arkets. 
4.  The  proposal  for a  European Export  Earuc  suggests that the  Corr~ission 
would like this to be  an  instrument  doinc duty  for the unsuccessfully-
attempted harmonization in respect  of export  credit  insurance  and basic 
data for  export  financing.  \{hile this is indeed regrettable,  and it  ~s 
most  proper that  effort:-:  ::ho·_:ld  be made  to mend  matters,  neverthelecs 
there is a  real  danger of taking nctior..  to deal  1.·Ti th one  export  sub-sector 
1.·1hich  looks clearly needed there but  uhich is misconceived  from  the point 
of vim-.r  of future  overall  harmoni zntion.  The  miscalculation ;wuld probably 
only  become  apparent  v1hen  that  overall harmonization took place,  not  v1hcn 
the :C:Uropean  Export  Ban}::  1.-:a:::;  first  cot  up. 
).  As  a  matter of principle,  the Baropenn I:xport  BnlLlz  1.-1ould  net  only 
in a  subsidiary capacity,  and if possible in cooperation with merchant 
barucs  and other national  D.[;encies  engnginc in export  financing and insurance. -5-
In other words it would  assur.1e  only  part  of the  financing  and  insurance 
of the  export  operation concerned.  But  all the  points adduced  in 
support  of the need  for  a  European Export  Bank  hold  good  also  for  that 
part of the operation \vhich it would.  not be  financing or insuring.  So 
the  problems the  Commis::don  r.JCntions  arc not  thereby  disponed of,  merely 
reduced to  ::;maller  proportions.  'l'hic  could onl;y  be  solved by  having 
the European  Export  Bank  finance the whole,  or at any  rate the great 
bulk,  of each  export  operation concerned,  uhich \·rould  put  paid to the 
principle of "subnidiarity". 
6.  The  unc  of interest  nubcidies to boost  enterprises'  international 
competitive  capacity also appears dubious.  lJot  only  \Wuld this amount 
to posi  tivel~r massive  r.:arkct  intervention,  but,  ntill Horne,  the European 
Community  v:ould  thereb;j•  be  furnishing massive  export  aid vrhich,  t;lven  the 
rocv~· state of many  third countricn'  trade balances and balances of 
payments,  could trigger an  export-aid :!'ace  Hhich  in its turn would  be  only 
the preliminary  to  import  restrictions no  industrialized country  could 
afford. 
7.  The  Commission'n  proposal  for  a  European Export  Bank  is couched 
only  in ceneral terns:  no  tletailn Hhatcver are given as to \vhat  the 
various  col'i'lponents  of the  cyctem '!rrould  actually be.  Thic being so,  it 
is not  apparent  either Hhat  account  Hould be  taken in the planning of a 
European Export  Dank  of the a.s-reefi'lcnt  reached on  harmonization of export 
credit  insurance prior to the  enlargement  of the  ConmQ~ity.  Yet  it 
would be  Hell  to take account  of that  agreement,  particularl;y ac there 
would be  no  direct difficulties Hith the different national  systernn  of 
export  credit  insurance. -6-
8.  Tho  Comminnion  hints at  extension of tho  scope of the Europonn 
Export  Bank  beyond  export  financinG  and  export  credit  insurance,  but 
too  vaguely  for any  opinion to be offered on  this anpect at present. 
9·  All  in all,  the  Commission's  ideas in principle for better export 
finnncine  nnd  e::port  credit  insurance are  fine,  but  the issues involved 
arc  such that it would  be vor,y  difficult to deal with them  satisfactorily 
by  means  of a  Elrropean  Export  Dank,  and  the  fact  that the arrangement 
would  offer only  a  partial  solution is open to objection.  However, 
definitive assessment  must  await  the provision of details not yet  to  hand. U . 1"t  I  . C  .  C:: 
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A'IDi"EX  II 
UNICE  comments  10  november  1975 
CREATIOU  OF  A EUROPEAN  EXPORT  BANK  (EEB) 
Prclirni~~ry remarks 
Since the  1973  oil  c~ir.io major structural  changes  arc becoming  necessary 
not  only in the  indur.rl dalizcd economics  of the Hoot  but  aloo in those 
developing countries which  are poor in  Th~tural resources  and foodstuffs 
and have had to reduce their imports. 
The  industrial capacity of "the  oil-producing countries has  continued to 
rise as they follow tht:!  Host's  example  and  uno  their resources to 
transform their social struc-tures  c.nd  tradi  tiolk"ll  vrc.y  of life. 
The  Community  therefore faces  the problem in the near future of 
concluding major contracts involving  inter~~tio~~l cooperation,  which 
means  that it must  act as  a  single economic  entity able to offer 
potential buyers straightforward,  uniform terms,  procedurc3  and  types  of 
contract. 
IDTICE  has therefore examined Hith gre3.t  interest the Commission's 
propooal to set up  a  European Export  Bank  (EEB). 
European industry feels that at the present stage in discussion of this 
Community plan,  it should first review the problems  involved in an 
intertk"ttionnl "deal" in the absence of an appropri3.te multinational 
body,  and  then comment  on the role the Bo.nk  should play and/or the 
advantages  which it might  bring  indm~tr;y in th')  Comrm.mi ty. -2-
A.  :Main  problems arising in the absence of an EEB 
I. Contractual problems 
1. Prices 
rfuen  the buyer refuses to agree to the price being split up  into ito 
various  component  parts·for each  oupplier,  the problem ariseo of hovr 
to  express the price in a  single currency. 
(a)·The  currency ir.;  chosen by the customer:  it may  be  the currenqy of one 
of the suppliers or a  "third" currency,  vrhich  generally means  that the 
parties :'lCgotiate  among  themsch·es  on  ho'Vl  to  convert  the various 
prices into the single currency of the contract.  Here,  there is an 
exchange  rink if the currency of the contract  is neither the currency 
of the supplier nor of his sub-contractors  but  is that of payment. 
rfuen  a  payment  is to be made  in one  or more  currencies which  are not 
the currency of the contract,  exchnnec risks would nrise at 
the actual time of cashing of the relevant  sum. 
(b)  When  the  customer insiots on the supplier  choosing a  single currency, 
the came  problems arise. 
~ 2.  Invoicing and  credit documents 
If the buyer insists on having a  single opposite party ui  th which  to 
negotiate,  there must  also be  a  sinelc invoice and  possibly even a  single 
series of credit documents.  This means  that the porcor. responsible for 
invoicing must  also assur:w  recponsi  bili  ty vis-u-vis the buyer for all the 
contractual  commitments  and  must,  in additioJ.:.,  P<'Y  an,y  taxes generated 
because of the reinvoicin5. 
The  problem thus arines of how  to  share out  the payment  and before this 
can be solved an answer must  be  found  to the question of how  to allocate 
shareo in the  came  type of loan,  \'Then  each supplier Hishes  to hold hio  own 
documents  of title in respect  '.)f  the credit. 
i'lith  rega:z:d  to payments  IJadc  to  a  ::;inglc  country uherca::::  in fact  r;ovor.J.l 
countries are creditors,  n  consolidation agreement  may  have  been  r.oncluded 
to Hhich  only nome  of the countri  cs  conccrne:d  l:  :l.'JO  oul;scri  bed  or \Jhi ch  has 
been eotabli::;hed on differing rocec  fror:J  countx-;/  to  country. -3-
3·  Bank  guaranteeo 
The  problems  of devioing a  Hay  or~ allocating commitments  and  the  exchange 
risk arise again in connection with  the guarantee to be provided for the buyer 
expressed in a  single currency (fidelity bond,  performance bond). 
4•  Adminiotrative obstacles 
Member  States at  presc:~·i;  imponc  lovrer limits on the permissible percentage 
of foreign finiohed pr0Qucts  for  incorporation than those laid down  under 
Community  rules,  thus  reducil1(; the pcssi  bili  ty of participation agreements. 
II. Credit  insurance 
In specific cases of  multin~tional projecm, the agreements  concluded  among 
Community  inqurcro for the automatic  inclusion of "external" products or 
the provision of joint  cover have  not  yielded the results hoped for. 
Since the national  systems have  not  yet  been  harmonize~ it is impossible to 
achieve the necessary standardization of conditions ;.:hi ch  would  put  the 
suppliers on an equal  footing ;-ri th the buyer. 
This is particularly true when  only one  supplier represents all the others 
in dealings with the buyer and vrhere  there io therefore a  particular need 
for a  single insurer.  Thi~ applies to  covering credit risks and is even 
more  relevant  in the  cace of other types  of cover. 
vfuere  insurance is an essential prerequisite for obtaining  fi~~nce, it is 
possible that the insurance guarantee of one  country may  not  be  recognized 
ao valid for the purpose of obtaininc finance  in another. 
III. Finance 
All the difficulties licted  ~.-:,ove  have a  curnulative and maximum  impact 
when it comes  to financin;- -the  contrnct,  p;.rticularly 11here  one  of the 
suppliers ic  not  the leader of the operat:idll m•ci.  thc1·cfore  eben  not  hold 
the credit  documents  or the innurancc policy in his oun right • 
. In thin field,  even more  th:1.n  in the fieltl  1)i'  i:isur<:nce,  ::.;tandardized and 
concerte.c:I  rules in rc::::pect  of interest  r:1.tes 7  c)urQtion of loann  and,  in 
particular,  implementing procedures and  cri  tcri~ arc .still .:t  len;; 1u.y  off. -4-
Under  these circumstances,  even if one  cannot,  on  the  basis of experience  so 
far,detcrmine  exactly the dc0rce  +.o  which  each  of these  problems  has  a  negative 
effect in each !~ember State,  it can be  seen that the transactor has  no  choice 
but to assume  a  much  greater burden of responsibility than he  would  in a  normal 
commercial  operation.  This  strenGthens  the  case for setting up a  Europeru1 
Export  Bank  in vlhich most  of thc:-:e  problems  could  be  partly solved or  oolved 
completely. 
B.  The  role of an EEB 
An  export  bank  could  support  and  generate  multinational  Europe~~ transactions 
in the  following vmyr>: 
I.  Monetar;r aspects 
The  Bank  twuld  1::e  responsible,  in the  frnmcHork  of a  ccmmon  mor.ctary  policy,  for 
implementing agreements  oetvwen the Cor:u::.uni ty and non-mcr.1bcr  countries and  t-Jould 
help,  within the  Communi~y itself,  to solve the  pro1::le~s relating to the 
currency of the  contract  and the resulting exchange riskc for those  involved. 
Sharing the 1::uru<Jn  of the  exchange  rick  ( ci  thor by  equalization  o;·::-ra~ions 
between the debts  incurred anc1  the claims arising as  a  result of the  imports,  or 
by encouraging increasing use  of the  composi~e EUA  as  the currency of the contract) 
would  not  prevent  the EEB  at  a  later staee from  going further than merely lessening 
the risk and  assuming the risk itself by  using the monetary or  insura~ce and 
reinsurance instrurnentn  which  the Bank  i tcelf ''oulcl  determine depending on the 
nature and  scale of the transactions. 
This meru1s  that the  Co~~unity': coordinating facilities should already be available 
to the parties when  the contract  is beine n0gotiatec1. 
Uhen  the contract is subsequently drafted,  the best  solution v10uld  be to offer the 
buyer a  loan  (even an intcr-::anl: loan)  vlhich  cculcl  be  uced  by all thone  involved 
to make  cash  pn.yme!1tc  ·,;hen  the various  instalments of the  loan are due.  This 
would  hel-p  to  solve  the mn.in  r~~oblcm::;  Hi th regard to prices,  invoicLF9  credit 
documentn,  administration ancl  finru1ce. "-. 
-5-
Once  agreement  has  been reached on the object of the contract and  the 
responsibilities of those involved,  the  Bank  could then grant  the buyer a 
loan which rrould  incorporate directly the terms  and  arrangements  for 
repayment. 
As  regards cases of lack of performance which might  be relied upon  by  the 
debtor to account  for  his failure to comply  Hith the repayment  plan laid 
down  by  the EEB,  on  the  &rounds  of the suppliers' failure to implement  the 
contract  properly,  contr<•ctual  t.,'11arantees  (fidcli  ty  bonds,  performance  bonds) 
could be  issued to the buyer  by  the  Balli~  on  behalf of the suppliers;  the 
EEB  would  thus have  complete and automatic  freedom  of action in civil law 
because of the guarantees  provided to it b,y  each supplier. 
2.  If the intervention machinery described above  Hero  adopted,  the EEB'n 
activities Hould  have  to be  extended to include both  loans  and  the risks 
involved. 
If a  premium  had  to be paid as  a  counterpart  to the risk,  it could  be  claimed 
directly from  the  buyer  folloHing the usual  practice.  If,  fo1·  practical 
reasons,  the premium  l-Jas  paid by  the  supplier:.::,  it Hould  have  to  bE'~  included 
in the price. -6-
3.  Financial resources 
The  banks  involved in a  financial  transaction in conjunction with the EEB 
would  pay  a  reserve not to the buyer  but  to the Bank,  which would  then add 
to this its own  resources,  and  make  available to the buyer,  through the  same 
banks,  the funds  to be  used to pay  the exporters. 
If this solution vrere  adopted,  the contract  "t-lOuld  be  implemented  simultaneously 
b,y  the buyer and  the procedure  for  the exporters simplified.  The  same 
advantages would  be  obtained as regards the terms of finance  (poriod of 
'  repayment,  single rate,  representative nature of the loan and  guarantees 
involved). 
The  problem  of providing the  Bank  Nith its capital and  how  this should be 
shared out  io essentially a  political question '1-lhich  must  be  solved even if a 
different Eystem  - less satisfactory from  the point of view of European industry 
from  the one  described here v:ere  adopted. 
In any  event  t'he  Bank's  c;:apital  must  enable it to pursue from  the outset 
its role as a  fund-raiser '·Ihich,  given the  economic  situation of the Member 
States, it Hould  find difficult to accomplish on  the intcrmtional capital 
markets  (increase in resources). 
4.  Economic  relations 
Tho  autonomy  vrhich  the EEB  should be  granted  vis-~vis Member  States in 
matters of financial  o~ economic  policy  should help to improve: 
the negotiation of agreements ilith non-mer.1ber  countricn; 
the "moralization" of export  credit policies  (insurance,  financinc) 
introduced by  11cmber  States or their main  corapcti tors. 
c.  ConclusionG 
In view of the foregoing,  European industry advocates  the creation of a 
European banking organization with a  broad measure  of financial  autonomy.  The 
EEB;should  concentrate on  lending,  financing  exclli~nge transactions and -7-
trade-linked investments. 
Ao  regards  insurance,  UNICE  would  like tho  Bank  to servo initially as a 
coordinating and liaison body  between the various  national  insurance organizations 
for  projects involving firms  from  various  Community  countries and  in the  longer 
term to take over the role of reinsurance body  for  the harmonized national 
syotems. 
From  the ver.y  outso~tbe EEB's  activities should be based  on  standard policies 
and  premiums  and a  uniform clasdfication of countries. 
The  Bank  should be  involved right  from  the negotiating stage,  preferably 
using a  supranational European  currency,  in respect  of all multinational contracts 
or contracts of benefit to the Community  involving anything in the region of 
or exceeding one million ECUs. 
Financing costq  should match those of major  competitors and  be related to 
current interest rates,  the type  of product  to  be  exported and  the country 
of destination.  Fixed rates could be  offered rcprcsentinb the average of the 
cost of using own  resources· and capital invested on  the interna.tinntll and  national 
-.capital markets. 
To  make  the system as flexible as possible,  the new  body  (the  EEB  or a  special 
branch of the EIB)  should not normally be  closed to the financial  institutions 
and  insurance companies  of tho Member  States. 6/46-6 
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1.  In vcr,y  general  terms,  the Federation considers that the degree  of 
development  of tho Community  makes  it difficult to enviaagc the 
aubatitution of a  unified European system for the different  existing 
national  ~ystema of guaranteea for exports  and  even more  ao  in the caae 
of financing. 
Specific though it m~  be,  export  credit is only one  of many  clemente 
which together form  the overall liquidity position of exporting buaineaaea. 
However,  these  elemonta differ aignificantly from  one  countr,y to another. 
It is as  neceasar,y to avoid the  aituation where  the national  export  credit 
mechnniams  can be  uaes  to distort competition as it ia desirable to 
leave  each of these,  at the technicalfunctional level,  free to uoe  the 
moot  appropriate forma  of intervention,  taking into account  the methods 
of financing made  available to busineases by the banking and  financial 
oyatems  as  a  whole. 
Conaequently,  the Federation conaiders that,  if any initiative is to 
be  taken,  it should only concern the completely particular case  of the 
guaranteea  and  the financing of major contracta for the  export  of 
capital  goods  in which businesses from  several members  states are parti-
cipating. 
2.  With  regard to these,  it ia certain that the necessity of dividing 
these contracta into national  sharca,  guaranteed and  financed by distinct 
national  ayatema,  is at  preaent  a  considerable  source  of difficulties 
which should not  be  undereatimated. 
It can aometimes  happen that none  of the national  syatems  ia prepared 
to guarantee certain peripheral  elements  of  a  contract with the  result 
that theae  remain  exposed to risk of  non-p~ent and  are not  eligible 
for the  moat  favourable  conditions  of finance. -2-
It can aleo bo  tho caoe that all tho national  eyetemo  concerned will 
not  accept  identical conditione  no  to the duration and  particularly 
tho rate of interoot  on  tho credit. 
Finally,  it m~  happen that certain national contributiono to a  contract 
can only be billed in the currency of the countr.y in quootion,  which 
makee  it impooeible to offer the foreign purohaoer a  global  contract 
eoprcooed  in a  oingle currency. 
It ie,  however,  important  to note that thoee difficultiee,  like those 
'tthioh  renul  t  from  exchange  riake - for oxporto billed in a  currency other 
than that of the exporter - are  not  peculiar to multinational contrncto. 
Billing in oeveral  curronoieo  io not  al'tT~c conoidored  a  diondvantnge by 
tho foreign purchanor;  finally,  in tho caoc where  certain national  ohareo 
arc subject to,  for example,  different termo of credit,  the  important 
point for the purohaeer ie that the  average coot  reoulting from  tho 
different credit terms  applied nhould be  ontiofaotory  • 
.. .  ~  ,. 
Insofar as tho multinational  operntiono of the  induotrioo  in tho  Con~unity 
o~  bo  handicapped vio-0-vio external competition,  thin handicap m~  be 
partially attributed to the difficultieo liotod above  but  many  oxperto 
conoider that thio in  oven more  tho  rooult  of tho  extreme complication 
involved in mounting the oporationo  and  the often exooooivo time  involved 
in agreeing upon all the financial  clausen  of the contract. 
Thone  complicntione and tho  time factor are eeocntially due  to the need 
for the induntrial  and banking negotintoro  of multinational operationn to 
dincuaa,  oucceooively and  oeparately,  the guarantee  and  financing 
conditione  of tho contract with the national ineitutione whooo  natural 
tendoncc  ie to limit their oontributiono  ao  far an  poooible to the 
etriotly national participation.  In tho cane  of contracto which  include 
oupplioo  which  are difficult to claooify into national catogorieo,  the 
nogoti~tion of financial olauoee  acceptable to thooo  inotitutiono,  the 
oupplioro  and tho  purchaooro  require of the negotiatoro  a  ncrioo  of 
contnotn,  diocueeiono  and  coming and  going which mny  take a  conoidernblo 
period of time.  During thin prooeoo,  tho foreign purohaoor,  not  kno'tling 
what  will be  finally decided,  m~  be  tempted to accept  an offer which, 
although porhapo  loco  interonting,  io nevertheleeo more  immediate  and 
moro  certain it ie the oxcenoivo prolongation of thio period 'tthcn  tho 
contract  io boing mounted  and  the rooulting uncertainly constitute tho 
principal  diffic~lty in multinational  oontr~tc. -3-
Consequently,  tho Federation considers that  one  essential  improvement 
to be  made  to tho  present state of affairs would  be  to simplify and 
accelerate negotiations by the  strengthening of cooperation between those 
concerned. 
3.  Subject to the essential  role  which  must  be left to the banks,  certain 
members  of tho Federation are of the opinion that  a  European Export 
Bank  could,  to a  limited degree which  remains to be  defined,  fulfil  a 
useful  role and- over and  above  its direct functions  - contribute to 
convergence of certain aspects  of tho  insurance  and  possibly also of tho 
financing of export  credit.  Tho  majority,  however,  consider that the 
Commission  proposals  go beyond  the established needs.  They  have 
doubts  as to whether a  European Export  Bank  could be  effectively  provided 
with the means  which  would  permit it to extend to businesses  involved in 
multinational  operations many  more  facilities than those presently 
available.  They  fear,  finally,  that the creation of an institution 
specialising in multinational  operations might  create distortion between 
operations at  a  European love  and  those  at the national  level which  could 
bo  detrimental to the  overall  coherence  of the Community's  export  aid 
policy. 
These  factors  lead the Federation to believe that the  suggestion made 
in tho laat paragraph  ~f section 2  above  would  at  the present  stage of 
integration,  amount  to appreciable progress.  It would  be the task of the 
bodies  concerned to define,  in liaison with the Commission  and the 
interested sectors,  the most  appropriate forms  of cooperation to facilitate 
the  arranging of multinational contracts capable of effectively facing 
up  to competition from  outside the Community.  The  initiative of this 
nature already taken by the credit-insurers shows  the  w~  which  could be 
followed by  al  who  are  involved. 
The  Federation does  not  exclude the possibility of this pragmatic  approach 
leading in time to the creation of  a  European body for guaranteeing and 
financing multinational exports.  It is,  for this reason that,  at this 
stage,  such an  appronch  seems  to the Federation to meet  the views  of 
both thooes  who  consider the creation of  a  European Export  Bank  totally 
premature  and  those  who  have  no  fundamental  objection to the  idea,  but 
consider that its implementation requires further  examination~ 